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Abstract:
This paper suggest a typology of possible sources of synergies and relates the
different types of synergies to corresponding types of coordination mecha-
nisms. The propositions regarding the relationship between different types of
synergy and different coordination mechanisms are illustrated with exam-
ples from the Danish company, Danfoss.
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I:  Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to propose how these different kinds of syner-
gies should be coordinated. Economizing on the costs of coordination is im-
portant because high cost of coordination due to improper coordination may
lead to dis-synergy if the resources spent on coordination more than offset
the gains in efficiency. Lack of proper coordination may also prevent the re-
alization of synergies because no sharing or complementarity is achieved.
Likewise, loss of accountability caused by corporate management interven-
tion in the affairs of independent business units may add costs to synergy
exploitation that more than offset the benefits. Despite the importance of
economizing on coordination costs,  the issue of how to coordinate different
kinds of synergies has received scant attention so far, although a few studies
have explored part of the question, for example, how resource sharing affect
the efficiency of strong incentives (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986; Govinda-
rajan and Fisher, 1990) and the relationship between organization structure
and synergy (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Jones and Hill, 1988). The paper takes
the perspective of corporate management in addressing this issue.
The paper is structured into four major parts. The first part (section II) deals
with the identification of potential synergies. Section III discusses different
forms of coordination and their associated costs. In the third part, section IV,
that discussion is linked to the sources of synergies identified in the first part
by relating the coordination requirements of the sources of synergy to the
characteristics of the different coordination mechanisms discussed in the sec-
ond part. In the fourth part, section V, the discussion is illustrated with ex-
amples of coordination of synergies found in the Danish company, Danfoss,
which is described briefly in the following1. The implications of the illustra-
tions are discussed in a concluding remarks section.
Danfoss has been one of the most successful Danish manufacturing compa-
nies since its establishment in 1933. Every single year since 1933 Danfoss has
shown a positive profit. Danfoss is Denmark's largest industrial group with
an annual turnover of 15 billion DKK. and has almost 20,000 employees. The
company manufactures thousands of different products and product models
within 14 broader product lines, particularly mechatronical products for in-
dustrial markets such as thermostats for cooling and freezing equipment,
comfort automatics (products for temperature control, radiator thermostats,
etc.), cooling and air-conditioning automatics, hydraulic components and
industrial instrumentation (e.g. electronic flow meters).
Most of Danfoss’ products have one thing in common: They are located in
technical equipment and systems to control dynamic processes. Danfoss has
                                                
1 The illustrations are drawn frown from a case-study of Danfoss (Iversen and Christensen, 1999).
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global market leadership within several of its product areas (e.g. some types
of hydraulic equipment, intelligent cooling systems, radiator thermostats,
non-CFC compressors and thermostats for refrigerators and freezers). The
relatedness in terms of technologies and markets provide rich opportunities
for synergies of different kinds. Danfoss has, however, followed a path of
increasing decentralization and delegation concurrent with considerable
growth in the last three decades. Thus, from the death of the founder in 1966,
and markedly in the last decade, emphasis has shifted from centralized coor-
dination to delegation of operating and financial responsibility to the prod-
uct line level.
II:  Sources of Synergy
Vertically and horizontally integrated firms exists for a number of reasons.
Adam Smith argued that the degree of division of labor is limited by the ex-
tent of the market. If demand is insufficient to obtain maximum scale effi-
ciency in certain activities and market imperfections prevent selling excess
capacity to external customers, then scale efficient activities provide a ration-
ale for sharing capacity among different lines of business internally (Teece,
1982). The internal workings of firms may also create pressure for growth in
the range and size of activities performed. As explained by Edith Penrose
(1959), indivisibilities lead to organic growth because increasing the degree
of capacity utilization of existing assets through sharing between different
uses lead to the acquisition of complementary or supporting resources. These
new assets will also be indivisible to some degree, thus leading to continued
pressure to expand the size of the corporation to avoid idleness of resources.
Dedication of activities to other, complementary, activities also lead to ex-
pansion of the firm because dedication creates vulnerability to appropriation
of rents by trading partners (Williamson, 1985). For these reasons, firms tend
to become diversified in terms of activities and markets served. It is generally
believed that the diversity in the assets and activities of diversified firms can
be exploited to achieve benefits, often referred to as synergies, by sharing of
activities subject to size economies (economies of scale/scope) or by per-
forming mutually adjusted (complementary) activities.
A:  Asset sharing synergies
Synergies may be obtained by sharing assets between business units if pro-
duction based on these assets are subject to declining average unit cost, that
is if economies of scale or scope can be obtained. One source of size econo-
mies is equipment dedicated to a particular task, which allows this task to be
performed with greater efficiency than with generic or non-specific equip-
ment (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). Increased division of labor and
specialization of tasks allows subsets of activities to be performed with
greater efficiency by reducing the costs of setting up and changing tasks, and
by accumulating more experience and knowledge of the particular task.
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Dedicated equipment and specialized tasks are only efficient when the serv-
ices they produce are required in high volumes because dedication and spe-
cialization comes with a loss of flexibility that reduce the value in alternative
use. Thus dedication and specialization create indivisible capacity. Sharing
can reduce the loss from idleness of indivisible assets by increasing the de-
gree of capacity utilization. Finally, increasing the dimensions of physical
objects (e.g. buildings) may be less costly than multiplying similar, but
smaller ones to reach a sufficient scale (Langlois, 1997).
In Danfoss asset sharing opportunities include the possibilities  of sharing
key technologies among products and product lines which allow the com-
pany to amortize the costs of acquiring technological capabilities and knowl-
edge. Danfoss also exploit its opportunity to share its brand capital among its
businesses as well as its sales efforts in smaller geographical markets. Physi-
cal resources are also shared to some extent in Danfoss. Thus some of the
components manufacture as well as buildings in foreign locations are shared
among product lines when it is deemed efficient. However, due to increasing
diversity of the overall activities, asset sharing is generally occurring only
among the most related activities and products, while the proportion of as-
sets shared among all product lines has declined with increasing heteroge-
neity of the demands posed by the product lines.
B:  Complementarity
Efficiency gains can also be achieved by adapting different assets or activities
to a common purpose by making them mutually supportive and eliminate
waste from reworking of outputs (Porter, 1996). Complementarity can be
achieved in a succession of activities where different steps in a chain are ad-
justed to the preceding and/or proceeding steps for example in the timing of
transfer (e.g. JIT), or by improving the interface between activities (making
the output fit the input requirements, and/or changing the input require-
ments to fit the output) (Porter, 1985). Likewise, by adapting to existing re-
sources, new assets can be made more efficient and new opportunities can be
exploited faster than if the complementary assets had to be acquired as well.
The effects of obtaining complementarity between activities performed in
succession will be referred to as vertical complementarities, which  can also
be obtained at higher (strategic) levels, for example by accompanying prod-
uct line proliferation, or increased rate of product development, with flexible
manufacturing systems and increased customer segmentation (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990).
In Danfoss increasing product differentiation has been accompanied by in-
creasing product line control over both product development, manufacturing
and marketing/sales, which has increased opportunities for mutual adapta-
tion among these stages of value creation, as well as more product and prod-
uct line specific investments in dedicated activities. This change has been
brought about by increasing emphasis on specialized products as well as in-
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creasing scale of individual product lines which has made it possible for the
product lines to achieve efficient scale of operation in most of their activities
and thus reduced the need for sharing among activitities.
Complementarities achieved by combining assets or activities to perform a
single task can similarly be called horizontal complementarities. Horizontal
complementarities may be achieved by adapting parallel activities to each
other to increase the value of combining the outputs at a later stage, for ex-
ample by making intermediate products that fit together when assembled
(Whitney, 1988), or by enhancing the combined functionality of bundled
products to customers (Spiller and Zelner, 1997).
While Danfoss’ product lines have gained increased autonomy due to in-
creased scale and managerial emphasis on financial accountability, corporate
management is still trying to promote the exploitation of product comple-
mentarities among product lines in the marketing stage through joint sales of
products targeted at specific areas of application such as water purification.
Danfoss also has an opportunity to create complementarities among some of
the technologies involved in creating some of the more complex products by
integrating technological capabilities in for example electronics, software and
mechanics.
Three fundamental sources of synergy can thus be identified leading to
proposition 1:
Synergy can be obtained by:
1. Sharing indivisible assets whose acquisition cost are amortized over multiple uses.
2. Optimizing the fit among sequentially performed activities (Vertical complemen-
tarities).
3.  Combining the outputs of mutually adjusted activities to achieve superior func-
tionality of the combined output (Horizontal complementarities).
These different sources of synergy require different forms of coordination if
asset sharing pose coordination problems that are different from the prob-
lems of coordinating mutual adaptation.
III:  Forms and Costs of Coordination
The need for coordination arise when the outcome of one activity depends
on how, or when, another activity is performed. In self-sufficient (closed)
systems activities are coordinated within the system itself, but specialization
among systems (for example firms or business units within a firm) require
the systems to engage in exchanges with other systems whose action they
cannot control directly. Thus the need for some form of exterior coordination
arises. Among firms coordination is achieved through autonomous adapta-
tion to signals in the form of prices and in the form of more or less compre-
hensive contracts stipulating the terms of exchange and cooperation. Market
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coordination may become too costly if trading partners are mutually de-
pendent because insuring against opportunistic behavior from either party is
impossible unless all future contingencies are known, which is unlikely be-
cause people have limited information processing abilities (Williamson,
1985). Organizing dependent activities within a firm put a limit on oppor-
tunistic behavior because disputes are settled by fiat (Williamson, 1985). In-
side firms a number of coordination mechanisms are available ranging from
market-like transfer prices to hierarchical ordering through planning and
direction, to team-like continuous mutual adjustment. These polar cases have
different properties with respect to incentive effects and use of resources, and
thus to the cost and efficiency of coordination.
Coordinating through transfer prices and mutual adjustment maintain a
large degree of accountability (i.e. relatively strong incentives) at the busi-
ness unit level which is difficult to uphold when hierarchical ordering is in-
volved. Centralized planning remove responsibility from business unit level
to corporate level, and thus diminish the strength of incentives.
The amount of resources consumed by coordinating activities depends on
the type and amount of information that needs to be processed and transmit-
ted. Once transfer prices have been set, they require little additional informa-
tion to be collected and transmitted. Resources will of course have to be
spend on determining the type of transfer pricing rule1 (e.g. cost-based, nego-
tiated, market based or strategic) and settling the terms, but once established,
companies tend to stick to a single transfer pricing rule (Eccles, 1985). The
information that has to be transmitted both laterally and vertically is quanti-
fiable (financial and quantities) and therefore easy to communicate. Transfer
pricing also allow standardization of information into financial terms making
it easily comparable across time and business units. Transfer pricing thus
consume few resources in coordinating activities.
Mutual adjustment between business units requires more intensive lateral
communication to discover the needs and expectations of the partner, which
in case of changes in the circumstances of the cooperation or uncertainty
have to continue as long as the exchange continues. The information ex-
changed laterally is unlikely solely to be quantitative, because then transfer
pricing would suffice. Vertical communication, however, can be in financial
terms since actual coordination is performed by the directly af-
fected/involved parties. Mutual adjustment, thus, poses information proc-
essing requirements at the corporate level similar to those of transfer pricing.
Planning and direction require less lateral information transfer than mutual
adjustment because quantitative and qualitative information is transmitted to
a hierarchical superior who decides on the appropriate action of the units
based on the information received (Arrow, 1974, Radner, 1992). This means
that extensive and heterogeneous information has to be processed at the cor-
porate level and thus consumes considerable amounts of corporate resources.
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Figure 1: Costs of different coordination mechanisms
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Economizing on costs of weakened incentives due to corporate level inter-
vention and resources spend on transmitting and processing knowledge re-
quires that the more expensive ones (mutual adjustment and planning) are
reserved for the transactions that require them. Mutual adjustment is less
costly than planning because accountability is maintained at business unit
level, and consume less of scarce corporate management resources because
information is quantitative2. Mutual adjustment may also incur less distor-
tion of information because information is transmitted directly to those with
operating responsibility instead of going through a higher hierarchical layer.
IV:  Selection of coordination mechanisms
Sacrificing incentive intensity is necessary when strong incentives lead to
sub-goal pursuit at the expense of overall performance. High levels of inter-
dependence between business units obscure individual contributions to a
cooperative venture, and thus make it very costly to reach an agreement on a
distribution of rents that is perceived to be fair by all parties. Differences in
actual or perceived interdependence of partners may also create conflict be-
cause the one experiencing the least amount of interdependence will be less
committed to continue the relationship and may hold up their partner for a
larger proportion of the rent generated (McGann and Ferry, 1979). If conflict
between business units arise, intervention from the corporate level may be
required. Since contributions may be obscured in the case of high interde-
pendence, quantitative and financial information is inadequate to settle con-
flicts over distribution of gains, which means that conflict settlement requires
transmission and processing of qualitative information to and by corporate
management.
Corporate management does not have to receive and process qualitative in-
formation in the absence of conflict, but high levels of interdependence still
require extensive communication between business units in order to coordi-
nate activities because changes in one unit affect the outcome of another.
Standardized information on quantities and costs will not convey knowledge
of the effect of changes in one unit on another and may also be received too
late to prevent destruction of value if they are only calculated periodically.
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Qualitative information on planned changes and feedback on the effect on
other activities therefore have to be communicated between the concerned
parties for gains to materialize.
Thus the levels of interdependence and conflict has to be considered when
selecting a coordination mechanism for an exchange. Thus we have proposi-
tion 2:
The choice of coordination mechanism depends on the level of interdependence and
conflict3:
• Transfer pricing is the least costly coordination mechanism. Transfer pric-
ing is appropriate when the levels of interdependence and conflict are low.
• Mutual adjustment is more costly than transfer pricing, but less costly than
planning and direction. Mutual adjustment is appropriate when the level of
interdependence is high and the level of conflict is low.
• Planning and direction is the most expensive form of coordination. Plan-
ning and direction is appropriate when the levels of interdependence and
conflict are high.
A:  Ascertaining the level of interdependence
Different ways of ascertaining the level of interdependence have been pro-
posed, for example based on the pattern of the resource flow between differ-
ent tasks (Thompson, 1967; McGann and Galbraith, 1981; Van de Ven, Del-
becq and Koenig, 1976), the volume and significance of the exchange
(McGann and Ferry, 1979), or the extent to which a business unit’s outcome
is determined by activities performed in other units (Kelley and Thibaut,
1978, Victor and Blackburn, 1987).
Thompson’s interdependence construct describes three discrete types of in-
terdependence (pooled, sequential and reciprocal4 which has become a stan-
dard reference, whereas the Kelley and Thibaut/Victor and Blackburn inter-
dependence construct use a continuos (numerical) measure of interdepend-
ence which require numerical data on the outcomes of different situations5.
McGann and Ferry’s construct of interdependence is a checklist of factors
affecting perceived and real interdependence6. The latter two approaches
require data on specific relationships to be useful, whereas Thompson’s con-
struct is concerned with the nature of a relationship which is more useful
with regards to analyzing the organizational requirements of the different,
discrete types of synergies.
Thompson (1967: 54) described pooled interdependence as situations where
“each part renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the
whole”. Pooled interdependence is the lowest level of interdependence in an
organization because no unit is directly dependent on another unit. If two
business units are engaged in a relationship, where one unit has to perform
its activity before the other is able to perform its activity, the business units
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are sequentially interdependent. Even higher levels of interdependence
(reciprocal) is incurred if both business units are affected by the concurrent
actions of the other business unit. The different types of interdependence are
illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2: Different types of interdependence
Pooled Sequential Reciprocal
 Task A Task B Task B Task B Task A  Task A
McGann and Galbraith, 1981: 63
B:  Interdependence of different kinds of synergies
Vertical complementarities can be described as sequentially dependent be-
cause they are obtained between sequential activities such as R&D and pro-
duction or production and marketing. Horizontal complementarities stem
from parallel activities that make inseparable contributions to a common
outcome7, and will, thus, be reciprocally interdependent. The level and na-
ture of interdependence incurred by asset sharing is more complicated to
assess, because asset sharing can take different forms and involve different
types of relationships. When the shared asset is intangible such as a patent or
a corporate trademark, it can be used in multiple applications without con-
gestion or depletion. None of the users of the asset will consequently be af-
fected by the use of the asset by other users8. Transfer of intangible assets is
similar to sharing of intangible assets because the asset can still be used by
the unit from which it was transferred which means that the transferring
unit’s outcome is not affected by the transfer. Sharing and transfer of intan-
gible asset will thus result in pooled interdependence. Sharing of tangible
assets also leads to pooled interdependence when, for example, a shared
sales force or a building is used by different units at the same time. However,
as noted in chapter 2, asset sharing sometimes coincide with vertical com-
plementarity when the services of the asset serves as an input to other activi-
ties. A shared tangible asset such as a production plant manufacturing com-
ponents for use in different products thus form a sequential relationship be-
tween the unit possessing the asset and the users of the outputs and will
therefore incur sequential interdependence. Transfer of tangible assets also
create a sequential interdependence between the recipient and the former
user, since a tangible asset can only be used by one unit at a time. If the trans-
fer of a tangible asset occur infrequently, for example when a machine is
transferred from one unit to another, then the units will only be sequentially
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interdependent at the time of the transfer, but will otherwise exhibit pooled
interdependence.
Figure 3: Interdependency of different synergies
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In other words, asset sharing generally creates less interdependence than
vertical complementarities, which in turn cause less interdependence than
horizontal complementarities.
The symmetrical dependence present in reciprocal interdependencies
dampen manifest conflict because each party will incur losses if cooperation
is terminated, whereas the asymmetrical dependence present in sequential
interdependencies allows the less dependent business unit to hold up the
more dependent one. Thus the level of conflict is assumed to be higher when
sequential interdependence is present than in case of reciprocal interdepend-
ence. In other words, vertical complementarities, being sequential interde-
pendencies, are associated with high levels of conflict and a significant de-
gree of interdependence, and should thus, according to proposition 2, be co-
ordinated through planning and direction. Likewise, horizontal complemen-
tarities should exhibit low levels of conflict, because dependence is symmet-
rical, and high levels of interdependence. Mutual adjustment should, thus, be
the appropriate coordination mechanism for horizontal complementarities.
This leads to proposition 3:
• Asset sharing should be coordinated through transfer prices.
• Vertical complementarities should be coordinated through planning and
direction.
• Horizontal complementarities should be coordinated through mutual
adjustment.
V:  Coordination of synergies at Danfoss
Danfoss is divisionalized with ten product divisions grouped into three
“product families” acting as boards for the product family’s product divi-
sions9 (cf. figure 4). Danfoss has seven cross-divisional committees for, re-
spectively, standardization, marketing, purchasing, quality assurance, pro-
duction technology, product development and information technology. The
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committees consist of members from different divisions and corporate func-
tions. The committee for standardization have 12 councils called “Technical
Advisory Groups” (TAG’s) overseeing Construction, Quality Assurance,
Production Equipment and Logistics, Sales/Marketing, Purchasing, IT, De-
sign and Corporate Identity, Plants and Transport, Environment, Human
Resource Management, Finance, and Components and Materials. The mem-
bers of the committees are appointed by the executive committee, while the
members of Danfoss’ TAGs are appointed by divisional management. Since
the end of the 1980s Danfoss has also systematically promoted inter-
divisional efforts in nurturing key technologies of importance for more than
one division.
Figure 4: Danfoss’ organization-structure winter 1998/99
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Decision making responsibilities have extensively been delegated to divi-
sional management, even the right to implement, for example, large devel-
opment projects or major acquisitions10. Generally, the involvement of the
executive committee in the affairs of the individual division depends on the
perceived need. The executive committee does not interfere with divisions
with satisfactory financial performance, but intervenes if a division’s results
are unsatisfactory over a longer period, or if its development activities have
strategic importance for larger parts of the corporation.
Among the corporate management’s control- and coordination mechanisms
are so-called “perspective plans”. The perspective plans contain information
on each division’s plans for the coming three years, and explanations for de-
viations from the budgets contained in the previous perspective plans. The
perspective plans are developed in connection with the budget-making pro-
cedure. The executive committee has in recent years, although not every
year, initiated the development of the perspective plans by suggesting a
theme (for example how to create and exploit core competencies or improve
cash management) for the year’s perspective plan to the managers of the di-
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visions. Divisional management collects information from department man-
agers and writes up the perspective plan which is delivered to the executive
committee four months later. The executive committee then reviews the
plans and suggest possible changes. In addition, the executive committee
receives monthly and quarterly reports from divisional management. Plans
for projects running more than three years are reported on ad-hoc basis. The
executive committee sometimes suggests specific projects to divisional man-
agement, but the divisions are not obliged to accept the proposals. In the
following sections it will be described how Danfoss coordinates the exploita-
tion of the opportunities for synergy described in the first section of this pa-
per.
A:  Organizing asset sharing in Danfoss
The three following sections will describe how the sharing of marketing,
manufacturing and R&D assets is (and has been) organized in Danfoss. The
analysis of the organization of asset sharing is then followed by an analysis
of how Danfoss organizes complementarities.
The organization of shared marketing and sales assets
Until 1971 all marketing assets were shared. As part of the early steps to-
wards divisionalization in 1971 the product groups (divisions) were encour-
aged to build their own sales departments. Moreover a sales group with re-
sponsibility for direct sales and administration of the sales and service net-
work (service departments, sales companies and sales agents) was esta-
blished. This sales group was later divided into two divisions with responsi-
bility for separate geographic regions.
By the end of the 1980s the sales companies became more autonomous. They
became organized as individual profit centers with the objective to increase
the productivity of the sales force. They were also allowed to sell comple-
mentary products from companies other than Danfoss, provided the prod-
ucts met Danfoss’ standards for quality and did not use the Danfoss brand.
As part of major reorganizations in 1996 the sales organization was radically
transformed. The two regional sales divisions were dismantled and most of
the sales personnel divided among the product lines (within the divisions),
who assumed responsibility for their own sales activities and costs. While
most of the sales personnel has remained located in the national sales sub-
sidiaries they now report directly to the product lines and not to a common
sales division. From the existing sales organization 12 regional sales organi-
zations were formed with separate subunits for each product-line in high
volume markets.
Sales offices in smaller countries or regions where Danfoss has no local
manufacturing activities operate as if they were independent sales agents
with the right to refuse to market and sell products that are not sufficiently
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profitable, or to renegotiate transfer prices with the supplying product lines.
Thus, what remains of shared of marketing assets is coordinated through
(negotiated) transfer prices. The extent to which marketing assets are shared
among the divisions has dropped due to the increasing diversity of the re-
quirements to the marketing capabilities of the sales organization and in-
creasing scale of sales of individual product lines. Thus where product lines
have sufficient scale of sale to support their own sales organization, they
have assumed responsibility for doing so, whereas the communal sales or-
ganization has remained in markets where sales of individual product lines
are unable to reach an efficient scale.
The Danfoss trademark is shared under strict guidelines for product quality
and how it must be used under corporate supervision. The corporate trade-
marks and reputation are furthermore protected by policies against using the
Danfoss logo on products manufactured by other companies, even if they are
sold along with Danfoss products by Danfoss subsidiaries.
Organization of shared manufacturing assets
The growing internationalization of production is reflected both in the paral-
lel process of divisionalization and decentralization that was initiated in the
early 1970s, and in the acquisition strategy that gained momentum during
the 1980s and 1990s. Production facilities have increasingly become con-
trolled by the divisions, implying among other things a gradual integration
of administration and the main production facilities of the individual divi-
sions. However, even when decentralization was taken further in 1988 en-
tailing among other things divisional responsibility for purchasing, corporate
headquarters still continued to operate corporate manufacturing plants, al-
though additional production activities have been transferred to the divi-
sions.
By the end of the 1980s only the manufacture of components used in large
quantities by multiple divisions remained centralized under corporate re-
sponsibility11. Internal sourcing from these central plants was still considered
strategic, among other things to maintain Danfoss’ reputation for high qual-
ity products, to sustain manufacturing capabilities and secure employment
levels, thus putting pressure on the divisions to buy from the corporate
plants. However, decentralization implied more freedom for the divisions
and product lines to choose alternative suppliers, and this was further
stimulated by the implementation of mandated full cost rather than subsi-
dized transfer prices.
Major reorganizations beginning in 1996 has, however, put more emphasis
on financial responsibility, also of the component manufacturing plants. As
part of the reorganizations by the end of the 1990s, ownership and control
over the central manufacturing plants were transferred to divisional level.
The product divisions today share ownership of the manufacturing centers,
while control over operations has been allocated to the division who is the
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largest internal customer. The plants are, however, supposed to operate as
independent profit centers supplying both internal and external customers.
The manufacturing centers compete with external suppliers for orders, since
subsidized transfers have been abolished. Transfer prices are based on a tar-
get profit for the center set by its board of directors that comprise divisional
managers.
The divisional ownership and control over the manufacturing centers has
also stimulated divisional use of technical expertise in the manufacturing
centers. Thus, for example, employees from the manufacturing centers par-
ticipate in divisional product development projects as consultants in process
technology, and do occasionally undertake development activities on behalf
of the buying division.
Manufacturing assets are also shared in the form of transferring equipment
between divisions. Asset transfer coordinated through bilaterally negotiated
prices. Manufacturing sites and buildings are also shared among the divi-
sions, although each of the foreign manufacturing operations is owned and
controlled by one division. Thus, new manufacturing operations are some-
times established in a building owned by another division in which case the
new operation rents the space from the division that owns the building. The
Comfort division is often the first to set up production in new regional mar-
kets because its primary product, the radiator thermostat, is comparably easy
to introduce into new markets and rather quickly obtains sufficient volume
for efficient manufacturing. Before manufacturing is set up, other divisions
are asked for their plans for the region, so that room for expansion and new
activities can be planned for. The manager of a local production unit will of-
fer only limited assistance to other divisions setting up new operations in his
country, and he is not rewarded for doing so.
Shared component production has thus changed from central planning coor-
dination until 1971 to changing transfer pricing policies with progressively
more financial responsibility (from corporate subsidized cost based prices to
full cost based prices with corporate pressure for internal sourcing, and then
to autonomous profit centers in competition with outside suppliers) and de-
creasing corporate intervention. Despite more divisional freedom to source
components from external suppliers, the corporate manufacturing centers
have grown in size up to approximately 1,000 employees in the last couple of
years. Even though growth is partly due to increased sales to external cus-
tomers, external sales are still modest, implying that significant advantages
of shared manufacturing assets are obtained and may have increased after
the central manufacturing plants have been exposed to competition from ex-
ternal suppliers.
Organization of shared R&D assets
In the 1960s Danfoss was a quickly growing functionally organized company
with a conventional R&D lab, Corporate Technology and Research (CTR).
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When Danfoss initiated the process of divisionalization the three newly
formed product divisions (product groups) were to encouraged to build
separate R&D departments. Since many technologies were considered com-
mon to more than one division, CTR was retained in order to serve the com-
mon interest of all divisions. However, the extent of asset sharing was re-
duced since more technologies were now being developed within the divi-
sions which were this way given more control over R&D directly related to
their product areas. Since divisional requirements to the development of new
technologies has grown more heterogeneous due to the expansion of the pro-
duct range, asset sharing would have been reduced even if the new divi-
sional R&D had been centrally coordinated.
Sharing of R&D effort among the divisions has continued to decline as the
divisions have increased their control of, and responsibility for, R&D. Thus,
during the 1970s shared R&D mainly occurred in the form of shared CTR-
personnel hired to do work on divisional projects which resulted in a frag-
mentation of the CTR’s activities. The tendency towards fragmentation of the
CTR activities was reversed in the 1980s. Under the direction of Jørgen M.
Clausen, son of the founder of Danfoss and present CEO of Danfoss, the CTR
regained significant autonomy and began to focus on a more limited number
of strategic R&D and venture projects involving prospects for product mar-
ket diversification. As a result, the previous close links to divisional devel-
opment projects were reduced, and a quite clear-cut division of labor be-
tween on the one hand the longer term venture and R&D projects in CTR,
and on the other hand the shorter term product and process development
activities in the divisions. It seems fair to conclude that this development also
to a large extent implied a decoupling of CTR and divisional activities. The
increased autonomy did not, however, increase asset sharing, since the tech-
nologies under development were not aimed at sharing among divisions.
The product divisions had through the 1980s grown so large that they be-
came capable of managing their own R&D within their respective business
domains, including - to some extent  - venture projects. This resulted in a
substantial transformation of the CTR from a R&D lab to a center for corpo-
rate technology management (and more or less related services) that tran-
scended the traditional role of the corporate R&D lab, even if R&D still
played an important role. While most of R&D in Danfoss was carried out in
CTR in the 1960s and early 1970s, the CTR-based R&D in the early and mid
1990s only covered about 20% of total R&D in Danfoss, corresponding to ap-
proximately 2.4% of the company’s turnover12. By then around one fourth of
total costs in CTR was financed directly by the divisions. While the divisions
had increased their own R&D efforts, there were no attempts at promoting
inter-divisional sharing of divisional R&D in order to avoid duplication of
effort in the divisions. Thus it is fair to say that the sharing of R&D assets
among the divisions decreased dramatically during this period.
Over the period, other activities than R&D-projects successively came to play
a relatively increasing role within CTR: technical services (consultants pro-
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viding technical and procedural assistance to the divisions), management of
patents, standardization and certification, quality control, and management
of technology across the corporation.
While corporate R&D projects earlier were initiated, carried out, and for the
most part financed by CTR, possibly with additional funding from the divi-
sions, the Corporate Planning department established during the reorganiza-
tion beginning in 1996 was given the option to fund 50% of R&D and venture
projects if the proposals: a) are backed up by at least two divisions, b) have a
long-term explorative perspective, and c) do not have a natural home base
within one of the divisions.
From a concentration of all R&D activities in one central R&D laboratory,
innovative activities have since the early 1970s gradually been spread to an
increasing number of locations at four different organizational levels: the
corporate level (strongly reduced activities particularly after the closure of
CTR), the “product family” level (so far only  activities in the Refrigeration
“product family”), the divisional level (strongly increasing activities due,
among other things, to the increasing number and size of divisions), and the
business unit level (strongly increasing activities due, among other things, to
the increasing number of acquisitions). While product development activities
increasingly take place in some of the foreign subsidiaries (for example de-
velopment of compressors for refrigerators and freezers in Mexico and large
frequency transformers in the USA), most of the fundamental technology
development still takes place in Denmark. This pattern may, however, be
changing due to the aggressive acquisition policy. Since an increasing num-
ber of acquired companies possesses strong R&D capabilities, it is likely that
not only product and process development but also fundamental technology
development will increasingly be conducted abroad.
The decentralization of R&D means that the technological assets have be-
come dispersed throughout the organization and now resides in different
business units and geographic locations. This means that sharing of techno-
logical assets can no longer be controlled within a single department but has
to be organized differently. How Danfoss solved this problem is described in
the next section.
Organization of inter-divisional technological asset sharing
In 1989 the director of CTR and a couple of R&D managers from the divi-
sions began exploring the opportunities for promoting cross-divisional
sharing of technologies. These efforts were prompted by the executive com-
mittee, which was anxious about the possible negative effect of the increasing
decentralization of R&D for the overall coherence of the corporation. With
assistance from both heads of development, manufacturing and marketing,
as well as from the executive committee, a new tool called the Technology
Pyramid was developed with the aim of contributing to the creation and dif-
fusion of technological capabilities. In 1991, the responsibility for the Tech-
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nology Pyramid was assigned to CTR, which as a result added a new role to
the department.
The Technology Pyramid contains a selection of technologies in which Dan-
foss can (or wants to) claim world-class expertise. These technologies have
significant value for more than one division13. In other words, the Technol-
ogy Pyramid is not a total directory of the corporate technology base (the
complete portfolio of technological capabilities)14. It is a continuous reflection
of the strategic prospects and priorities for the corporate technology base. At
the same time it is a tool to promote inter-divisional coordination and build
integrated competencies across different parts of the corporate organization.
Thus, the Technology Pyramid is not static but regularly subject to analysis
and changes, especially regarding the technologies under consideration.
“Synergy” was situated as the top of the Technology Pyramid in 1996 re-
flecting the overall ambition and common denominator of the Technology
Pyramid15. Danfoss defines synergy as:
“.... a net improvement in output, margins, or some other measure of perform-
ance that can be reliably traced to structured, purposeful collaboration among
different units or to the merging of two or more units.”
At the next level in the pyramid were seven “key competencies” defined as
those capabilities in which Danfoss wishes to achieve global leadership16. The
aim was to turn key competencies into core competencies, which Danfoss
defines as a complex mesh of knowledge and skills that make its products
and services better than anyone else’s. Danfoss’ ability to select, exploit and
develop the right core competencies is considered crucial to the present and
future competitiveness of the corporation. Developing and maintaining core
competencies is considered to require so much effort that Danfoss is only
able to focus on five to eight of them at a time.
The lowest level of the Technology Pyramid contained the “key disciplines”,
defined as the capabilities that Danfoss wants to master on a level equal to
the best of its competitors. In 1996, several of the initially 29 disciplines were
withdrawn from the pyramid, either because they were considered well-
established (five disciplines), or because they had failed to show the antici-
pated potential (nine disciplines were kept under observation). Additional
“key disciplines” were also introduced, and of the total number of 20 “key
disciplines” in 1996, eight were predominantly related to product technol-
ogy, seven primarily to process technology, and five to marketing and man-
agement17. Since 1996 the attempts to distinguish between “key competen-
cies” and “key disciplines” have been given up and the two categories have
been fused into the notion of “key technologies”. In order to focus and
strengthen the commitment and efforts of the technology management ambi-
tions, the altogether 27 “key competencies” and “key disciplines” were re-
duced to 12 “key technologies”18. These technologies have received more
resources than were assigned before. The emphasis has shifted from a mix of
R&D, manufacturing and marketing technologies towards product devel-
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opment technologies which dominate the present portfolio of “key technolo-
gies”. Another current development of the Technology Pyramid is the on-
going development of a database aiming at storing all relevant information
concerning the “key technologies” for ease of access and comprehensiveness
for the users of the Technology Pyramid.
All employees of Danfoss are allowed to suggest new “key technologies”, but
the decision to include a technology in the Technology Pyramid is dependent
upon approval by one of Danfoss’ seven cross-divisional committees to en-
sure that the technology has a wide variety of application prospects in Dan-
foss. The committees review the content of the Technology Pyramid, and one
or two members from each committee are appointed to form a technical ad-
visory group responsible for the practical work and decisions concerning the
Technology Pyramid. The committee responsible for a “key technology” ap-
points one to five gatekeepers who are responsible for the actual develop-
ment and monitoring of the relevant technologies, and a sponsor who is re-
sponsible for assuring proper linkages and coordination between the com-
mittee and the gatekeepers, and for making sure that potential users of the
technology are made aware of developments. The gatekeepers do not work
full time on their assigned technology but are expected to fulfill their normal
duties in the division that employs them. The responsible committee can rec-
ommend and approve activities beyond what is budgeted in the division
employing the gatekeeper.
At the practical level inter-divisional experience groups formed by the gate-
keepers promote the improvement and development activities associated
with each of the high-priority technologies. The gatekeepers’ tasks depend
on the characteristics of the technology, which differ widely among the “key
technologies”. Accordingly, for some technologies, the work of the gate-
keeper is application-oriented learning by doing, while for others the pri-
mary activities are exchange of experience and networking.
The corporate technology management activities also include the develop-
ment of tools for analyzing technologies and the maintenance of a directory
listing the technological expertise of all Danfoss employees assigned to tech-
nology development.
The way sharing of technological assets in Danfoss has been coordinated has
thus changed from the centralized planning style until 1971, followed by a
decade of a somewhat failed attempt at coordinating through transfer prices
(direct divisional funding of an increasing number of individual projects
without much coherence).  A significant part of technological asset sharing in
the form of technical services organized in the Central Service department is,
however still coordinated through transfer prices. The move back towards
central planning of corporate R&D in the 1980s resulted in a decoupling of
corporate R&D from the objective of upgrading divisional technological ca-
pabilities through shared technology development. This objective appears to
be better served through the invention of the technology pyramid which al-
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lows the divisions to mutually adjust their common technological develop-
ment through the networks of committees, sponsors and gatekeepers. Mu-
tual adjustment was required because R&D had become scattered through-
out the organization which means that qualitative information about the na-
ture of technologies and their potential applications has to be collected before
the assets can be shared unlike the case of the Central Service department
where a number of shared assets have been assembled. The ongoing organ-
izational restructurations has also put increasing emphasis on establishing
devices for coordinating sharing of R&D belonging to the divisions rather
than sharing assets under corporate ownership. Thus, the dynamics of tech-
nology diversification and increasing decentralization has changed the way
Danfoss organize and coordinates sharing of technological capabilities.
B:  Organizing complementarities in Danfoss
Vertical complementarities
From the early steps toward divisionalization in 1971, product lines and divi-
sions have gradually gained control over increasing parts of their individual
value chains. Thus, the initial three divisions were given control of their
product specific manufacturing activities, and were furthermore authorized
to build their own sales and R&D departments. The trend towards increased
divisional autonomy was sustained in the reorganizations in 1988 and 1996
which gave the divisions increased control over their activities. As Danfoss
continued to grow, activities have continued to be split up among self con-
tained business units (divisions and product lines) in order to decrease prod-
uct range heterogeneity within each business unit and thus strengthen mar-
ket focus. Increasing control over sales and marketing within the business
units provides a more direct linkage between development, production and
marketing which eases mutual adaptation and monitoring of results because
performance is evaluated against customer reactions.
The vertical complementarities between R&D and production/marketing has
in the last thirty years been strengthened by increasing divisional control
over R&D. In the 1970s, when R&D was still centralized to a significant ex-
tent in the CTR, the division gained control over the R&D efforts through
their direct funding of R&D projects carried out in the CTR. The CTR thus
became an extension of the divisional R&D labs providing manpower
(human asset sharing) subject to direction from the division supplying the
funds to the benefit of vertical complementarities between the project and the
divisional activities.
During the 1980s, the division grew to be so large that they were capable of
performing most of the R&D activities they needed for running their busi-
ness. The CTR had also been decoupled from the day-to-day business of the
divisions and focused on long term projects and business venture develop-
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ment. By the mid-1990s 80% of Danfoss R&D-expenditure was spend by the
divisions, whose R&D costs varied from 2-10% of divisional turnover.
As part of the major reorganization in 1996 the radical decision was taken to
close CTR which by then had 150 employees. This was done to spur divi-
sional management to take full responsibility for R&D and to more thor-
oughly integrate technology and business strategies. Top management felt
that the existence of CTR tended to become an excuse for not building suffi-
cient technological capabilities at divisional levels. Two types of problems
were considered to be associated with the CTR-model. First, there was only
limited communication and interaction between the divisions and CTR. Sec-
ondly, the funding of CTR constituted an increasing problem. The corporate
funding of basic CTR activities was taken out of the divisional budgets, and
thus, imposed on the divisions as a sort of tax, and divisional management
tended to oppose this model arguing that the divisions did not get (enough)
value for their money. Some of the CTR’s R&D projects were transferred to
the divisions, and in one case to the “Refrigeration product family”, who has
thus gained control over the projects which should increase the chance of
achieving vertical complementarity.
The perhaps most radical change implemented during the major reorganiza-
tion beginning in 1996 was the reorganization of the sales organization
where the two regional sales divisions established in 1988 were dismantled
and most of the sales personnel divided among the product lines (within the
divisions), who assumed responsibility for their own sales activities and ex-
penses. As of April 1998 the old sales organization has been further decen-
tralized with each of the product lines receiving full financial responsibility
for its own sales. Only a small residual of the central sales organization has
been retained at the corporate level (Market Development Division), while
the rest has been transferred to 12 regional sales organizations with separate
sub-organizations for each product line. Sales and marketing is now carried
out by separate sales organizations for each product-line except in markets
where sales are too low to reach an efficient scale.
Reorganization from a functionally organized to a divisionalized and in-
creasingly decentralized company has thus given the product lines more con-
trol over both product development, production and sales over the past
thirty years. This has increased the opportunities for planning and direction
of the interfaces between the stages of value creation within each of Danfoss’
product lines, and relieved corporate management of that responsibility.
Horizontal complementarity
Even though the continued decentralization has decreased centralized coor-
dination of horizontal relationships among the different business in the last
thirty years, it has remained an objective for Danfoss to stimulate inter-
divisional cooperation, which is reported to have been successful, especially
in the last six years. The seven committees have played an important role in
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stimulating inter-divisional cooperation. Furthermore, Danfoss’ ten product
divisions were, in 1998, grouped into three “product families”, Refrigeration
Controls, Motion Controls, and Heating and Water Controls according to the
criteria of similarity and common interest. One of the objectives of forming
the product families was to increase awareness of gaps in the product ranges
between the divisions in the product families, which may lead to identifica-
tion of new business opportunities. So far the “product families” do not have
their own staff or joint functions to facilitate the creation of horizontal com-
plementarities, except for Refrigeration Controls, which has established a
joint R&D unit that supports joint projects in the field of refrigeration tech-
nology. The other two “product families” do not share functions or activities
at “product family”-level, except for a few bilateral coordination projects
concerning marketing and technology substitution.
The role of the product families and committees is to some extent to assure
the inter-divisional coordination which were previously carried out by cen-
tralized departments such as the CTR, the sales divisions and the executive
committee.
While most of the R&D effort was still carried out in the CTR, the CTR was
able to coordinate the development of complementary technologies, but the
increasing share of R&D performed by the divisions has reduced the corpo-
rate control over R&D. As the product range and the size and number of di-
visions expanded up through the 1970s, the divisions gained more influence
on the types of activities performed in the CTR through an increasing extent
of projects directly funded by the divisions (i.e. transfer pricing). By becom-
ing more reliant upon project based funding, the CTR became more of a pool
of experts providing assistance in divisional development projects than an
initiator of corporate wide technology development. This resulted in in-
creasing numbers of small projects without much coherence and overall
guidance, which would otherwise have benefited the realization of horizon-
tal complementarities.
The realization of horizontal complementarities between different technolo-
gies common to several divisions may not have been reduced as much, if the
CTR had maintained its autonomy. However, the creation of inter-divisional
horizontal complementarities between technologies did not increase signifi-
cantly when the CTR finally did regain some autonomy in the 1980s, since
the main projects of the period were not related to integration of technologies
or development of complementary products and technologies. Rather, the
CTR began to develop new business ventures which were unrelated or unin-
teresting to the divisions. The implementation of the technology pyramid
during the 1990s may, in addition to increasing inter-divisional asset sharing,
also have contributed to the realization of horizontal complementarities
through the awareness of the different key technologies which the technol-
ogy pyramid has contributed to disseminate throughout the company. Over-
all, the realization of horizontal complementarities at the inter-divisional
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level have been reduced in the process of ongoing decentralization despite
the efforts involved in implementing the technology pyramid.
Horizontal complementarities in marketing have similarly been reduced as
the company has continued to decentralize. During the first half of the 1990’s
Danfoss tried to promote “cross product-line selling”, but the limited “cross
product-line selling” activities that were implemented were not perceived to
have been successful, and had, furthermore, contributed to obscure the actual
cost of selling individual products. That made corporate management feel
that product lines needed more attention to the real cost of selling, which
were considered too high. Thus, there are no specific rewards to sales man-
agement and personnel for trying to sell, or learning about, products from
other product lines. The product lines do, however, source products and
components from each other based on prices settled by negotiation. One of
the objectives of the Market Development division established in 1998 is to
contribute to filling the gaps in Danfoss’ product range and coordinate col-
laboration among product lines. This will be done by targeting specific
“Strategic Business Areas” (SBA, cf. section 6.2.5) where products from dif-
ferent product lines can be marketed collectively for a specific application.
Thus, instead of having all sales personnel trying to find opportunities for
“cross product-line selling”, creation of horizontal complementarities be-
tween related products is now being promoted by the Market Development
Division targeting specific “Strategic Business Areas”, where the benefits are
perceived to be greatest.
Thus, horizontal complementarities are now coordinated through specialized
organizational structures (i.e. product families, Market Development Divi-
sion and the technology pyramid) facilitating mutual adjustment, instead of
providing incentives for “cross product-line selling”. Mutual adjustment
among divisions, which is facilitated by the cross-divisional committees and
the formation of the product families has also replaced centralized planning
of horizontal complementarities which has been gradually abandoned since
1971.
VI:  Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed that of the three  basic sources of synergy available
to multibusiness firms, asset sharing should be coordinated through transfer
prices, vertical complementarities should be coordinated through planning
and direction, and horizontal complementarities should be coordinated
through mutual adjustment.
The paper has shown that the typology of synergy is useful for describing
synergies in Danfoss, thus confirming proposition 1. The trend in Danfoss
towards increased emphasis on transfer pricing and mutual adjustment and
decreasing direction and planning from the corporate headquarters supports
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proposition 2. The organization of vertical complementarities within busi-
ness units (i.e. divisions and product lines) substitutes divisional planning
and direction for corporate planning which supports both the proposition
that intervention by corporate management is the most expensive coordina-
tion mechanism (proposition 2) and the proposition that vertical complemen-
tarities needs to be coordinated through planning and direction (proposition
3). The relationship between type of synergy and type of coordination
mechanism in Danfoss is summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Coordination mechanisms for different synergies in Danfoss
Coordination mechanism
Example of synergy: Transfer prices Direction and
planning
Mutual
adjustment
Shared key technologies Technology
pyramid
Competence
Centers
Shared technical services Transfer prices
Shared buildings Rent (hearing in
planning phase)
Shared components
manufacture
Transfer prices
Shared sales in small markets Transfer prices
Shared corporate trademark
and reputation
Rules and
policies
Complementary technology
development (inter-divisional)
Technology
pyramid
Complementary products
strategy (Strategic Business
Areas)
Market
Development
division
Vertical complementarity
(product-line specific R&D,
production and marketing)
Within
divisions:
product-line
control
Table 1 shows that asset sharing synergies is generally coordinated through
transfer prices (rent in the case of shared buildings, zero in case of trademark
and reputation), except for shared R&D assets which are coordinated
through mutual adjustment within the technology pyramid. Vertical com-
plementarities, as proposed in proposition 3 are coordinated through direc-
tion, whereas horizontal complementarities are coordinated through mutual
adjustment consistent with proposition 3. Proposition 3 is thus generally
supported by the fact that tangible asset sharing is coordinated through
transfer pricing, although mutual adjustment have superceded transfer price
coordination in the case of R&D asset sharing. However, while the case study
of Danfoss has provided some support for the propositions, further empirical
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research is needed to test the propositions. Especially case-work on concrete
examples of the different types of synergies appear to be needed to test the
validity of the propositions.
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1 Note that transfer prices can also be zero, usually in case of zero marginal costs or high cost
of measurement.
2 Assuming that corporate management resources are more valuable and thus have higher
opportunity costs.
3 In case of low interdependence between units, high levels of conflict does not affect
outcomes. This instance is therefore not considered.
4 Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig (1976) has added a fourth type of interdependence called
team interdependence, which is defined as situations where “the work is acted upon jointly
and simultaneously by unit personnel at the same point in time.” (Van de Ven et al, 1976:
325). Team interdependencies cannot be divided between units. In thisc paper, activities are
defined as team interdependencies, whereas synergy is conceptualized as interdependencies
between activities.
5 The level of interdependence for a unit can be ascertained by calculating the ratio of the
sum of outcomes (squared) contingent on the actions of other units to the sum of all out-
comes (i.e. unit A’s dependence on other units = outcomes influenced by other units2/all
possible outcomes2). Likewise, the level of conflict can be calculated as twice the sum of the
products of unit A’s outcome and the product of other units outcome divided by the squared
outcomes of both unit A and other units (i.e. level of conflict = 2(unit A’s outcomes influ-
enced by other units * unit A’s outcomes independent of other units + other units’ outcomes
influenced by unit A* other units’ outcomes independent of unit A)/(∑(all outcomes)2 )
(Formulas derived from Victor and Blackburn, 1987).
6 Transactional interdependence is increased the greater the number of different resources
exchanged, the greater the amount of resource exchanged pr. unit of time, and the number of
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transactions pr. unit of time. The shorter amount of time before cessation of relationship sig-
nificantly affect outcome, the greater interdependence will be. Higher value of the resource
also increase interdependence. The value of a resource depends on the cost of substituting
the resource, the cost of locating another supplier, the qualitative importance of resource for
outcomes, and the duration of relationship. The direction of resource flow also affect inter-
dependence (McGann and Ferry, 1979). Thus the receiver of a resource may perceive another
degree of interdependence than the supplier. Assets going back and forth between business
units increase interdependence compared to exchanges where one type of assets is traded for
another.
7 The contributions are inseparable because one activity cannot create the same amount of
value if it is not supported by the other activity.
8 Unless of course one of the users are capable of damaging the asset, for example by selling
low quality products using a corporate reputation for high quality products.
9 In 1999, Danfoss has acquired a german company (effective from June 1.), Bauer
Antriebstechnik GmbH, which will become the eleventh division in Danfoss and be part of
Motion Controls product family. Bauer develops, produces and sells electric motors, gears,
and gear motors, some of which can be integrated with the products of the Drives Division.
10 The corporate function “Mergers & Acquisitions, Legal Affairs and Patents” assists in
negotiations and analysis when a division wishes to acquire a company.
11 These central plants produce electronic circuits, plastic components, springs, stamped or
cold forged objects and surface treated components. They are all located in Nordborg.
12 Divisional R&D expenditure varied from 2% to 10% of divisional turnover
13 For technologies that are only important to one division, the division in question is
expected to take full responsibility.
14 Danfoss also has a directory listing the technological expertise of every employee involved
in engineering.
15 In 1996, “synergy” replaced the original five key areas of “management”, “management of
technology”, “continuous improvements”, “total marketing management” and “time based
competition”, which were never clearly operationalized into active programs.
16 Four competencies were primarily related to product technology (e.g. “control
engineering”, “mechatronics”, “man-machine interface” and “product development
technology”), while two were related to process technology (“methods and management
philosophy for continuous improvement”, and “materials and processes”). The last key
competence was “business concept development”.
17 However, the distribution of the “key disciplines” among the three categories is somewhat
ambiguous.
18 The content and names of the “key technologies” evolve as well, which makes it difficult to
track individual technologies.
